Decisive Results of the US 1st Marine Div., That Changed the Course of the Korean War 한국전쟁의 역사를 바꾼 미해병 1사단의결사적 무용담

내전에서 다져진 정예화된 중공군의 능력과 야간전투를 시도하는 전략을 무시한 맥아더 장군의 UN군에 대한 1950년 성탄절 진격명령은 미군8군과 10군의 패배로 인하여 한국을 잃게되는 풍전등화의 긴급한 상황을 초래했다. The order issued by General MacArthur to attack in the Christmas season in the year of 1950 had brought the desperate situation and total defeat of the US 8th Army Corp. and 10th Corp. who faced overwhelming Chinese People's Army trained well in their civil war, and challenged with their battle tactic of Night Attack.    

다음은 릿지웨이 장군이 미해병대 1사단의 장진호 전투가 끝난지 33년만인 1984년경 기록한 미해병 1사단과 사단장에 대한 획고록을 인용한 것이다. The following memorandum was written by General Ridgway at 33 years after the Chosin battle where the 1st US Marine Division fought in regard of the fighting forces and divisional commander.

"To the right of Walker’s Eighth Army, the 1st Marine Division, under General Oliver Smith, had been ordered to advance up on to the roof of Korea north and northwest to Kanggye and Manpojin on the Yalu. The only road over which the Marines could advance, was a single track dirt and gravel path, narrow, winding, crawling through forbidding cliffs and ridges, and climbing up over terrain as wild and inhospitable as any in all of Korea. One section known as the Funchilin Pass, was a ten-mile stretch that climbed 2,500 feet along a narrow, frightening shelf with an impassable cliff on one side and a chasm on the other. This road ended at the woebegone village of Yudam-ni on the southwest corner of the Changjin Reservoir that bleak and wind-blown stretch of ice that nearly marked a major disaster to our forces. But before it reached Yudam-ni, the road wound agonizingly up over 4,000-foot Toktong Pass where temperatures resembled those in Alaska. General Smith was as alive as Walker who was to the dangers that lay before him, and he started this advance with the conviction that he had neither the supplies nor the forces he needed to accomplish his mission. So he moved ahead with constant concern for the safety of his forces regardless of the urging from the X Corps headquarters that he speed up his forward movement. Before jump-off while not knowing the full measure of the disaster, Smith had learned of the collapse of the ROK II Corps on Walker's right wing near Tokchon, some seventy miles southwest of Smith's forward elements, which was the 5^th and 7th Regimental Combat Teams at Yudam-ni, itself some fifty-five miles short of the division's first objective, the village of Mupyong-ni.  All the terrain in between from Yudam-ni to Tokchon and from Yudam-ni to Mupyong-ni, was wild, rugged and nearly trackless.  Now Smith's wide open left flank was in a more perilous fix than before. 

Nevertheless Smith dauntlessly(fearlessly) set forth toward his objective, despite all the mis-givings(questions) occasioned by his judgment of the enemy's capabilities and his knowledge of the distances to be covered over almost impassable terrain. With some bitterness, he reported to the Commandant of his Corps that he had concentrated his Division into a reasonable sector; that he had taken every feasible measure to develop and guard the Main Supply Road(there was only one!); that he had prepared an airstrip at the south end of the Changjin Reservoir for air supply of critical items and for the evacuation of wounded; and that he had ensured that at all times he had possession of the high ground along the route of his division's advance. As it turned out these text book precautions were all that enabled this magnificent fighting force to battle its way out of entrapment in one of the most successful retrograde movements in American military history.  

The 1st Marine Division and two battalions of the 7th Division endured a far more bitter experience. But again thanks to courageous leadership and the extreme forethought of General Smith, complete disaster was averted. Smith as I have explained despite the pressure from the X Corps, took the time to keep his line of retreat open and secure as he moved his forces up into the barren plateaus near the Changjin Reservoir. He stockpiled ammunition, gasoline and other supplies along the way, held what high ground it could, prepared an airstrip for evacuation of wounded, and pushed ahead only when he felt reasonably certain of what lay beyond. There was intermittent hit-and-run resistance all the way and it was all Chinese, to judge from the prisoners taken. According to the doctors at the sickbays, the sudden, intense cold more than enemy fire, was the shocker. Smith felt certain now that a strong force of the enemy lay somewhere in his path and he suspected he was being drawn into a trap. The X Corps headquarters however under the whiplash of MacArthur's known wishes, urged him on toward his objectives, group of mud-thatched huts on the western edge of the Changjin Reservoir. When he reached there, it was late November, the bitter Korean winter had already moved in, and the Chinese Communists as their radio broadcasts had long been threatening, were ready to strike their mightiest blow. 

In the west, along the Yellow Sea, the Eighth Army had advanced once more north of the Chongchon River for the first two days against moderate resistance. GHQ's optimism seemed justified. But Walker was still opposed to any reckless advance to the border, and his fears were quickly realized. On November 26, the Chinese Communist Forces fell upon the Eighth Army again with fire power and ferocity. Attacking first on the right against the ROK II Corps, they practically destroyed Walker's flank, sweeping aside the remnants of the ROK forces in a matter of hours. Howling American profanity(curse) and blowing endlessly on their bugles, the Chinese troops then struck the U.S. 2nd Division, and in subsequent action, this gallant division lost over 4,000 men and much of its artilleries, signal, and engineer equipment. Only Colonel Paul Freeman's 23rd Regimental Combat Team withdrawing with his division commander's permission westward toward the sea, escaped intact(without damage). There were, Walker reported to Tokyo, an estimated 200,000 Chinese attacking, and the situation was close to desperate. This was not a counter attack, Walker warned, but a major offensive, and he knew it would be necessary for UN forces to pull in their necks. 

Across the granite cliffs and dismal(gloomy, dreary) gorges(small valleys) to the east, the 1st Marine Division stretched out along the twisting road from Yudam-ni through Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri, forty miles to Chinhung-ni on the south, heard the news of the collapse of the Eighth Army’s right wing.  Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Murray's 5th Marines followed by Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Homer B. Litzenberg's 7th Marines which had led the advance from Koto-ri, were ordered to attack to the west in a futile(useless) attempt to take pressure off Walker. Smith ordered them to proceed with caution and to watch out for ambush. As these two regiments moved out, they were rapped(struck) hard by the long-concealed Chinese. It was then that Murray and Litzenberg decided on their own without consulting Smith to call off the attack, and go on the defensive, disregarding Almond's orders as they figured the show was hopeless. 

The Marines had been looking for such a blow, and despite it, they managed to hold on to the high ground near the village. An attack by two assault battalions from the CCF 79th and 89th Divisions supported by mortar fire, developed in the night into an all-out drive by three Chinese divisions attempting to overwhelm the two Marine regiments, Raymond Murray's 5th and Litzenberg's 7th. By advancing in the dark, the Chinese avoided our air power, and were able to send overwhelming numbers against the Marines. They attacked along a narrow front in column formation, then deployed widely once they were within hand-grenade range.  Resourcefulness, fighting spirit and superior fire power of the Marines helped balance the scales, but the fighting was bitter in the extreme. The 18-below-zero cold made many of the carbines and BARs unusable although most of the M-1s and Browning machine guns resisted the freeze-up and stayed in action. At half past two in the morning, one Marine platoon set fire to a native hut, and lighted all the nearby ground, so they were able to wreak terrible slaughter upon the attacking Chinese. But with one formation cut to pieces, there would be a fresh one to clamber(crawl) on up over the corpses, and continue the assault. 

This and the subsequent attacks upon Marine units stretched out through the villages to the south, were among the bloodiest battles of the war. They cost the Division dearly but there was no rout and no disaster. At Hagaru at the foot of the reservoir, their commander had arranged to stockpile six days' supplies and these were supplemented by air-drops of small-arms ammunition, weapons, medical supplies, food and even drinking water.              But the embattled(fortified) Marines were most grateful of all for the doughty men of Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion who labored all night under floodlights to hack(scoop up & down) an airstrip out of the frozen earth from which the wounded could be evacuated. They completed the job in twelve hours, stopping sometimes to take up rifles in support of the ground troops out in front of them. The fighting grew more intense but the bulldozers roared and banged along until the job was done. 

So desperate was the situation with nine Chinese divisions available for an assault upon the Marines that General Almond urged General Smith to speed his withdrawal just as he had a few days earlier been pressing him to hasten his advance. Almond authorized Smith to abandon any equipment that might slow him down. But Smith was not going to abandon anything he might need. The speed of his withdrawal he said, would be governed entirely by the dispatch with which he was able to take out his wounded. As he intended to fight his way free, he would need all his equipment and he intended to bring most of it back. He did too and carried out in trucks all the men who were wounded along the way.  He left behind only those who had been killed in the fighting at Yudam-ni. For the eighty-five officers and men who lost their lives there, a field burial service was conducted before the withdrawal began.

The Marines pulled back in order, followed by a number of refugees.  An apron across a hydroelectric plant spillway hanging on a cliff side above a chasm, had been destroyed by the Chinese but General Smith had foreseen this danger, and had a tread way bridge air-dropped in sections in time to get his forces across, bulldozers and all. Two companies of the 1st Marines coming from Chinhung-ni seized and held the high ground commanding the crossing, and fought off all attempts to cut the column off. It was a long and tortuous retreat seeming to move inch by inch with fighting all the way. When the advance elements were entering Chinhung-ni, the southernmost village on the route, the last units were still in Koto-ri, ten miles to the north. Actually the retirement was more of an attack then a retreat for it was necessary for each unit to battle its way back against superior force to join the Marines in the village to the rear. This meant attacking often to take commanding heights so that enemy artillery could not zero in target at on the retreating columns along the road. The force at Yudam-ni slugged its way back to Hagaru at the lower end of the Changjin Reservoir. Here the Marines had to fight out on the ice of the reservoir to rescue the remnants of Task Force MacLean from the 7th Division, a force that had been split in two and nearly demolished by a sudden Chinese attack. Here Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith Jr., 32nd Infantry Regiment, won the Congressional Medal of Honor while gallantly trying to extricate his truck convoy filled with more than five hundred wounded, but losing his life in the attempt.  

Back through Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni, the Marines with some infantrymen and a few British Commandos, crept, clawed searched and fought their way, smashing roadblocks, beating off attacks from either side of the road, attacking and seizing hills along the route. Marine Aviation and the Fifth Air Force gave them constant close support, and dropped needed supplies. The airstrip at Hagaru-ri saw more than 4,000 wounded or severely frostbitten men flown out to safety. 

By December 11, the ordeal was over, and General Smith had brought his tough, battle-tired and half-frozen troops still in possession of most of their equipment and all of their fighting spirit, clear of the final defile into the beachhead area near Hungnam and into a defense perimeter they could have held with help from the Navy and Air Force for as long as they had been ordered to stay. 

The Navy at Hungnam, performed with spectacular skill although they received no banner headlines for their evacuation by sea of the entire X Corps and its’ equipment. But to take out from unfriendly territory, 105,000 troops, 91,000 Korean refugees more than 17,000 vehicles and several hundred thousand tons of cargo were in itself  a military triumph of no small dimensions. Equipment and supplies that could not be loaded, were destroyed on the beach, so nothing was left for the enemy.  

The 1st Marine Division which received severe punishment from a force of at least six Chinese divisions as it fought its way down off the Korean roof, was back in action in less than thirty days.  

역사가들이 나중에 밝힌 장진호 철수작전의 의미는 놀라운 것이었다. 장진호에서 미해병 1사단 및 육군 32연대에 대응했던 중공군은 12개 사단에 150,000명의 병력이었으나 전투 후 사단 전체가 피해를 입어 1950.4월까지 1/3에 달하는 45,000명을 보충해야만 했었다. History has discovered information since then that make the breakout even more remarkable. The opposing Chinese force totaled 150,000 men in twelve divisions.  The fighting at Chosin, put all twelve Chinese divisions out of action until early April of the following year. To replace his losses, the Chinese commander was forced to ask for more men 45,000 men, nearly one third of his strength. 

즉 중공군 2개 사단은 미해병에 의해 파괴되었고 2개사단은 미육군 32연대에 의해, 나머지는 미해군과 해병의 폭격과 혹한의 날씨로 파괴되었다고 판단된다. Seven of the twelve Chinese divisions were put out of action by the 1^st Marine Division.  Two of them were put out of action when task force MacLean (later Task Force Faith) fought to near total destruction. Two more were put out of action primarily by Navy and Marine Corps air, but perhaps finished off by the weather and the first Marine Division. The fate of the last CCF division is unknown.

장진호 전투가 진행되는 동안 서부전선의 미8군이 압도적인 중공군의 출현으로 붕괴되어 철수하게 되었고 동경의 맥아더 사령부는 한국에서 비상철수하는 계획까지 수립하는 풍전등화 같은 순간에 이러한 성과는 엄청난 것이었다.  The results of the fight at Chosin, were spectacular. Not until recently have historians recognized the decisive role that Chosin played in the Korean War. While the battles, at Chosin, raged the Eighth Army in the west, was withdrawing southward in the face of what was believed to be overwhelming numbers of Chinese. In Washington and Tokyo, plans were being made to withdraw entirely from Korea in the face of this Chinese offensive. 

나중에 밝혀진 사실이지만 당시에 중공군은 전체적으로 가용한 병력이 30개 사단인데 12개 사단이 파괴되어 전체적으로 40% 손실을 입힌데다가   2개 미육군 사단과 한국군 사단이 동부전선에서 피해없이 철수하도록 하여 중공군의 진격을 막고 한국이 공산치하에 떨어지지 않고 역전할 수 있는 기회를 미해병 사단이  만들었다. But unknown to the higher level planners, the Chinese at that time, had only thirty divisions immediately available for commitment in Korea. The successful fight at Chosin, cut the Chinese strength by forty percent. At the same time, the 1^st Marine Division’s success enabled the other two US and two Korean divisions to withdraw intact. With the Chinese losing forty percent of their strength, and the Eighth Army reinforced by the three US and two Korean divisions of X Corps, the line in South Korea, could be held. Korea did not have to be evacuated.