Exploration of Kum River Battle Place (Korean War) during April 20 to 21, 2025

Introduction

The first day covered the place of Kongju like the Geomsan-dong village, Woogeumchi Battle Place, Kongju City Hall, Komnaru Tour Area, Kongsan Fortress, Wangchon Creek & Oya Bridge to explore the actions of the 34th Regiment of 24th US Army Division. The second day covered the place of Sejong like Tuman-ni, Yongdam-ni, Balsan-ni, the Kaehwa Mt., Riverside of the Keumnam Bridge, and Seongdeok-ni around the Duwoo Peak and the Sparrow Pass to explore the defensive actions of 19th Regiment. It was good to travel on Sunday and Monday, but there was a heavy traffic jam around the West Hanam IC and its lampway to Kangdong. It is needed to avoid the Kangdong lampway and preferably to the Hanam lampway or avoid the West Hanam IC. This travel for one-night and two-day costed us of 200,000 KRW half of which were for gas and hotel expenses.

April 20, 2025

I and my wife started to drive my car at 09:00 for Kongju and entered into West Hanam IC taking the 2^nd Kyungbu Expressway newly paved at the end of last year. It was good to drive till I changed to Pyongtaek-Jaecheon Expressway at the East Anseong Junction, as I was allowed to drive at 120 km per hour that was the fastest speed limit in the expressways and drove through the Namhan Mountain Fortress through a new tunnel. I changed to Kyungbu Expressway at the Anseong Junction and drove for the Cheonan Junction. There, I took the Cheonan-Nonsan Expressway for Kongju. I drove out of Kongju IC, driving a little and changing the road at the North Kongju Junction. It was later realized that driving a little more south to the South Kongju IC was closer to the Geomsang-dong village which was our first exploration place. I drove south along the Baekjae Street and crossed the Baekjae Bridge in the Keum River. The street was straightly linked to the Provincial Road 651 paved along the river, and we passed by Gomnaru National Tourist Complex  and Kongju Weir. We arrived at a point near the Geomsang-dong village and pulled over the car at the edge of road.

The road was paved along the river dike, so I could watch out the river and the opposite place across the river. It was the place where Chinese crossed the river in 1950.7.14 at 08:00-09:30 through some barges carrying abouted  30 men. The number of Chinese initially reported by a L Company Lookout of the 34^th Regiment, 24^th US,Army Division, was about 500. This place was one of the Chinese main infiltrating route in the Kum River Battle, and the other one was in the Saejong City. The L Company of 34^th Regiment was defending around the river in front of the Gomnaru National Amusement Complex, which was the left defensive line of the regiment. I left my wife in the car and walked down a lamp way to the village. Passing through a small village assembly hall, I walked into some houses and found a working farmer looking quite old. I thought he might be heard of the battle if he was a native. He was so busily working, that I couldn’t talk a lot with him but got the information where the Chinese soldiers had crossed and marched away. The Chinese marched through the village toward the Geomsang Agriculture and Industry Complex near the South Kongju IC along the Gemsang Creek. He added he was three years old in time of the war and knew that all American troops in the Woogeumchi Valley, south of Kongju, had been killed by a horde of Chinese soldiers passing through this village. I returned to my car on the river dike and drove my car down through the village and the Geomsang Complex. I kept driving along the creek to follow the Chinese attacking route in the south of Kongju. The road was joined with the Woogeumchi Road stretched north- eastward to the downtown of Kongju and it was regarded the old road existed in the war, though on the left, the National Road 40 was lately paved out from Iin-myon around Tancheon. This confluence was the one of position of the 63^rd Field Artillery Battalion providing the frontline with supporting fires, which was in present Taebong-dong surrounded by mountains. While exploring, I tried to locate the artillery position and drove to the Woogeumchi Battle Place where the Donghak Farmer’s Force had fought with Japanese and Korean Forces. This was regarded as the head of the artillery position followed up downward south to Taebong-dong.

The Artillery Battalion was stationed in line with A Battery, Headquarter Battalion and B Battalion in the Woogeumchi valley, but the location of it was identified by a group of Chinese reconnaissance. The Chinese soldiers crossed the river at Geomsang-ni and bypassed the American frontline ambushing the artillery. An outpost of the artillery reported at 13:30 to the headquarter that enemy troops were coming up the hill toward them, but answered not to fire as the men might be friendly forces. As a result, this group of Chinese soldiers overran the machine gun outpost and turned the captured gun on Headquarter Battery. It began the attack of North Korean Regiment and hit the communication equipment, medical section, command post and ammunition vehicles. Another group of Chinese Regiment assumed 100 soldiers directly attacked the B Battery at 14:15, running down a hill from the west, like a bunch of squealing Indians. In confusion of the attack, a group of South Korean cavalry rode past the B Battery and attacked west toward the Chinese. No one knew what happened as a result of this intervention. The North Korean ambush caused most of the artillery men leave their guns and escaped south. On the way out, they found the body of their battery commander. More than 2 and half years later, the artillery battalion commander remains was found in a foxhole at the site. Although aerial observer saw two tanks on the south side of Kum River southwest of Kongju, the Chinese armor did not cross in force on July 15, 1950. Air strikes destroyed some of Chinese boats and strafed their soldiers, but some groups of North Korean force pressed south toward Nonsan by night fall of that day.  

The photograph shows a scene of the Woogeumchi Battle Place near here the 63^rd Artillery Battalion was destroyed by the North Korean Infiltrators crossing into Geomsang-ni of Kongju.

These accounts were abstracted from “Disaster at the Kum River Line” on the internet, which was used for my exploration purpose. While exploring the sites of the Woogeumchi Battle Place on the pass of the valley and the confluence place of Geomsang Road and Woogeumchi Road, I thought the historic battle place was still important in aspect of the military tactic. The Donghak farmer’s force once had stood along the ridges of the Woogeumchi Battle Place, but they had defeated. Just like it, the 63th Artillery Battalion was ambushed and destroyed here in the same valley.    

After completing the artillery batteries zone, we drove northward to the Gom Ferry Amusement Complex and parked at a designated parking lot near the river. I could see the Yonmi Mountain across the river at the parking lot. A ridge of this mountain was set up with machine guns in front of the L Company of the 3^rd US Army Battalion on the daybreak of 14^th July, 1950 just after the steel truss bridge, Kum River Bridge, which was sole bridge on which vehicles could go, was blew up by the engineer company. We crossed the road and walked down into a riverbed, exploring the defense line of the L Company. There was a trail along the terrace land of the river, and it looked ideal for the American troops to dig a trench on the high ground of the riverbed. I could see a village near the Yonmi mountain across the river, and it was less than 800 meters off the American defense line. The defensive zone was abandoned by the company commander, as it was getting hit heavily from across the river and the Yonmi Mountain. North Korean tanks approached to the river and trajectory shoot, and machine guns on a ridge of Yonmi Mountain raked bands of fires toward the L company.  Even though the company commander was threatened with martial law for his decision abandoning the zone without battalion commander’s order. I think his decision was consequently right when looking into an outcome of this battle and the withdrawal timing of his right company in Kongsan Fortress. The L company withdrew southward to the zone of 63^rd Artillery Battalion.

The photograph shows a scene of the Yunmi Mountain and Kum Riverbed in front of the Gom Amusement Complex in Kongju,

The regimental commander of 34^th US Army was learned at 16:00 from an escaped enlisted man who had reached his headquarter; Chinese forces had destroyed the 63^rd Artillery Battalion. The commander at once ordered the 1^st Battalion of Reserve Commander to launch an attack and rescue the men and equipment in the artillery area. However, this attack launched at 17:00 was halted by the Chinese machine gun fires just before the artillery area supposed being the point of confluence with the Bongjeong Street from Geomsang-ni and Woogeumchi Street from Kongju. The Reserve Battalion was withdrawn to Nonsan.

After walking along the riverbed, we went to a restaurant in a downtown. There, we had barbeque seafood lunches and resumed our exploration. We visited the Kongsan Fortress and tried to park our car, but it was difficult to find a space on Sunday. I thought it was springtime and a weekend, so parking lot was packed with cars. Fortunately, there was a free parking lot operated temporarily in front of the fortress, so I could park and went to the ticket booth of the fortress. We both were over 65 years old that free admission tickets were given after showing our identification cards. This fortress had been built in Baekjae Dynasty in AD 630 when the dynasty was defeated and withdrawn to Kongju by Shilla Dynasty. It had been also used for a military commanding office in Chosun Dynasty. In time of the Korean War, The I Company of 3^rd Battalion of 34^th US Army Regiment was defending it along the river. Its height was 110 meters on average, and the fortress looked unbeatable was constructed along the ridges and valleys. As the left company could not be located and their rear was heard being cut off, the I company commander was ordered to withdraw at night. His company took a right mountain ridge supposed as Wolseong Mountain and continued withdrawing southeastward supposedly to Kaerong. This company could be rejoined with the L company just east of Nonsan early in the morning of July 15. The main retreating rout was suppose being the provincial roads of 643 and 697 between Kongju to Nosan along which I remember driving to carry my mother who needed to be treated in Seoul, 5 years ago.

The below photograph shows a scene of the Kum River from the Kongsan Fortress which was defended by the I Company of 34^th US Army Regiment.

                                One of the defensive lines of the 34^th US Army Regiment was forced vacancy because of the K company which was severely weakened in the previous battle of Cheoneui and Cheonan and transported to Taejon before the battle. So, the right part of the regimental front supposed as being the distance between the Hyulji Creek and Wangchon Creek on the southern bank of the river. Consequently, Chinese didn’t attempt penetrating this area because of the geographical condition that was the Janggun Mountain dominating the north of the river, opposite to the vacant K Company front.        

In regard of the overrun of the artillery battalion in the rear of the 34^th regimental frontline, I am thinking of alternative decision of the regimental and battalion commanders; If they ordered the L and I Companies to retreat protecting the 63^rd Artillery Battalion when heard of the North Korean troops river crossing early in the morning on July 14 and when one of the artillery officer was reported from the L company withdrawn from the river front. If they ordered the reserve battalion stationed near Nonsan moving up to reinforcing the artillery guard, they could prevent overrunning their artillery from enemy ambush! From an outpost, at the early afternoon, when they hear of some North Korean troops were hiking up the hill in front of them, they could ring alert and starting to prepare for Chinese ambush taken place, one hour later. In consideration of the poor communication equipment, I am thinking it could be more feasible tactic that a reserve force would stand by the artillery unit in the rear.  

After completing the exploration of Kongju Battle place, at around 14:00, I and my wife dropped by a café near the Kongsan Fortress and took a cup of coffee. Just as like the parking lot, it was crowded with many customers on Sunday afternoon. We picked up our car and tried to go for the Kum River Bridge which had been made of steel truss and demolished just before the battle, but lost the way and crossed the other bridge, driving eastward to Sejong along the north riverside road. For about 5 kilometers of driving, I crossed the Kum River Bridge looking for the defensive position of the 24^th Reconnaissance Company that was the extreme left of the 19^th US Army Regiment defending for Taepyong-ni which was presently Sejong. This area was principally defended by a platoon sized company, but later as battle was progressed, it was reinforced with the TF McGrail Battalion. As soon as I crossed the river, I turned to left at the Kangnam Crossroad, taking the south riverside road named as Changbyuk Road. Driving for 4 kilometers eastward, I reached the site near the confluence of the Wancheon Creek where the reconnaissance unit was dispatched. As a group of North Korean forces tried to cross the river this area in the early morning of July 15, the regimental commander organized the TF McGrail with the 2/3 of his reserve battalion reinforced with two light tanks, 2 antiaircraft guns and 81 mm mortars and dispatched to this area. So, the regimental commander had almost none reserve force in rear. The reconnaissance company tried to link westward with the 34^th US Army Regiment, when they fought off the Chinese attempting to cross. They encountered with some North Korean troops who had crossed lower down in the 34^th regimental sector and stopped onward. Another North Korean crossing point was supposed as the confluence of Hyulji Creek where currently S-Oil Gas Station on the south bank. I parked my car at the edge of the Wangchon Creek confluence near the road and a small bridge that crossed the creek. Walking along the road paved above the riverbed, I surveyed the defensive front, and the opposite side of the riverbank wasn’t far, along which the riverside road of Kumbyuk was laid. I think in the aspect of Chinese, this area was quite inaccessible from the roads except for Kongju and Taepyong-ni, as the Janggun Mountain was dominating with its ridges down to the river. So, during the battle of Kum River, it was quite calm in this sector. Returning to my car, I drove slowly observing around river to the Cheongbyuk Bridge from which to the Wangchon Creek it was 4 kilometers above Taejon and Yusong.

The photograph shows a scene of the confluence with Wanchon Creek and Kum River, where the Reconnaissance Platoon was dispatched to identify the North Korean infiltration.  

April 21, 2025

After completing exploration of the far-left frontline of the 19^th US Army Regiment, I drove eastward and southward, taking the National Road 32. I drove to the reserved hotel in Taejon and slept and had breakfast there with my wife.

On the 2^nd day of my exploration, we drove for Tuman-ni of the south of Sejong where the 52^nd US Army Field Artillery Battalion was stationed to support fires for the 19^th US Army Regiment along the river around Saejong. The artillery batteries were 7 km southward off the river at a bend of the Yongsu Creek, where the present Saejong-Banpo Road and Tangjin-Youngdeok Highway abutted each other. I dove westward to Youseong from the hotel and turn right to north at the Taejon Momorial Hall Crossroad and kept driving to a under path around the South Saejong Junction, passing by the National Memorial Hall on the left. I arrived the supposed Chinse barricade point between ridges of Gilmajae Mountain and Suyang Mountain which was a narrow path at a bend of Ansan Creek. Due to this barricade, a group of American wounded troops carried on stretchers who desperately evacuated from Chinese attack were stopped and had to evade into a low hill near the Village Meeting Hall in Yongdam-ni 1. It was called One Pass and they thought it was impossible to carry the injured troops anymore. A military chaplain remained voluntarily with them, when the other leaved from for their escape. He was killed with other injured troops by North Korean soldiers approaching to them. A testimony said, “The chaplain was praying with the injured when he was shot death.” I walked around the village and found a temple near the hill. The village street was flooded with water, and it might cause from a breakage of the water supply system. I drove 2 km off the site and reached a bridge called as Paekryong at a bend of Yongsu Creek in Tuman-ni. Here, I drove crossing the bridge and arrived at Korean Army Welfare Center established at a mountain foot. It was surrounded by mountain ridges of Kuksa Peak which was abutting with Kum River on the north-west, and it was a main assembly point of the North Korean forces infiltrating the river around the present Kum River Tree Garden in Wondang-ni of Saejong defended by the C Company of 19^th US Army Regiment. It was believed to be penetrated early dawn in July 16 by the North Korean lifting their arms and supplies above their heads and another group of Chinese penetrating through the broken bridge and hiding into the ridges for establishing a barricade at rear of the American regiment. I looked for a cup of coffee at the center, but I couldn’t use it, because I was a civilian. There, I found some farmers working a paddy and approached them, getting the information. They looked seventies but one of them knew the battle heard from his parents. He told me, “These ridges behind me were dominant with North Korean troops attacking the US Artillery Batteries over there. The ridges and bend laying over there crossing the creek was occupied by American troops. A lot of dead bodies were found at this creek at that time.” Based on his explanation, I thought this bend area was the right point of the 52^nd Field Artillery Batteries that had been attacked.  The main infiltration-points in the Kum River Battle

The photograph shows a scene of the low hill in Yongdanm-ni of Saejong where a chaplain and injured American soldiers on stretchers were shot death by a North Korean.

The below photograph shows a scene of Tuman-ni, Saejong, where the 52^nd Field Artillery Batteries were set up.

           

 While the American infantries along the river line were struggling to stop Chinese infiltrating along the Kum River for two nights and three days form Jul 14 to Jul 15, the regimental commander were reported from the 1 and 2^nd battalion commanders that their defensive lines no more couldn’t maintained, as they were fired by infiltrating Chinese forces from the rear. The regimental commander was afraid of being cut off by the North Koreans roadblock that was supposed to be the bend of the creek in Tuman-ni. He tried to examine himself the enemy roadblock and if established find out any detour route. About 10:00, Jul 16, the commanding officer of the 52nd Artillery Battalion, Colonel Perry who had engaged in the first battle in Osan with North Koreans ordered to fire on the North Korean infiltrators passing over a mountain ridge on the west and relayed the infiltration to the behind artillery battalions. When his artillery was attacked and fired with enemy mortar, he assembled the personnel not involved in duty and led them directing his artillery, as he was closing in the enemy. When the regimental commander arrived at the roadblock, he tried to organize a group of attack against the enemy on the high ground supposed as Kilmajae mountain, but he was wounded and gave his command to the 1^st battalion commander. A major reported to the General Dean, the 24^th US Army Divisional Commander, in Taejon of the unsatisfactory condition, and the general replied that he tried to assemble a counter-attacking force and break the roadblock at around 15:30. The 1^st battalion commander then started back to his battalion along the river and shortly after ordered it to withdraw. In returning to the river, he was killed. At 14:40, a major took 20 men and circled the roadblock eastward and then southward trying to determine the enemy extent and find a bypass. Two hours later, the major’s group arrived the 13th Artillery Battalion started to displace southward. A few minutes later, he met the General Dean accompanying with two light tanks, four antiaircraft guns and vehicles. The regimental reserve force of G company dispatched to the far-left line was recalled by the effort of an officer running his jeep through the firing roadblock to relay the order and assembled at the 13th artillery position, with trucks dispatched from Taejon. Colonel McGrail was ordered to break the roadblock by the General and started with his relief force led by one light tank ahead and antiaircraft vehicles followed by another light tank. As soon as it entered the south end of the roadblock, it was heavily fired with enemy machine guns and antitank fires. Efforts to break the roadblock at both northern and eastern extremities disclosed that it covered a mile and a half of road. Behind the roadblock, the trapped men couldn’t see either of two attempts to reach them from the south because of a ridge cutting off their view. Not all the troops of the company C and A along the river line came to the roadblock, but many groups scattered into hills and tried to move to Taejon. At 18:00, the remaining last tanks boarding Colonel Meloy ran through the roadblock, clearing smoldering truck and equipment, following with 20 vehicles and a 105 mm howitzer truck. All night long and into the next day, July 17, stragglers and those who escaped through the hills filtered into Yousong and Taejon.

The below photograph shows a scene of the North Korean roadblock established at the rear of the 52^nd Field Artillery Batteries and assembly area of the 19^th Regiment for its withdrawal.

After exploring Tunman-ni battlefield, we drove to Balsan-ni where the 19th Regimental Commander set up their command posts. It was near to Tunsan-ni and the Kum River, and the A Company defended the river line from the present Haknarae Bridge to the City Hall for the distance of about 4 km. On the right sector, the Company C was set up its defensive line along the mountain foots of Kaehwa, and the left sector was covered by the B Company from the dike near Haknarae Bridge. On the left side of high ground across the present Saejong Street, the reserve force of F Company was supposed to stay in the Youkae Mountain behind the C Company. This area could be protected quite well in the process of battle and retreating from July 14 to July 16, due to the F Company supporting the river front unit’s withdrawal. However, it was fired from the eastern ridges of mountain peak, Ilchul Peak. The regimental commander was killed on the way of investigating the North Korean’s roadblock. I found a good cafeteria and some big restaurants as like Chinese Dishes in the area and walked along the village street which was supposed to be present in the war and cut off by the Saejong Street at the end.

The below photograph shows a scene of Balsan-ni in Saejong, where the 19^th Regimental Commander Post.  

After exploring Balsan-ni, we drove up northward a little along the Balsan Street laid parallelly the Saejong Street where the 1st Battalion Commanding Post was set up at the village of Kandong. It was supposed to be the current Administration Office of Kumnam-myon near the Bihak Mountain on the old highway (national road 1) linked to the Kumnam Bridge which was destroyed before the battle and reconstructed later only for pedestrians. This area and riverside front including the right-hand platoon of the B Company was overrun at 08:00 in Jul 16 by the Chinese troops wading through the river, around the broken Kumnam Bridge. It was critical to hold its position for the frontline units, so the regimental commander ordered the 1st battalion commander to organize a counterattack force with tanks and antiaircraft tractors and repelled the infiltrators to the north side. The river defensive line was tested by the small groups of North Koreans wading into the river or swimming across along the destroyed Kumnam Bridge. Enemy tanks were appeared already in the north of the river and all units in the river battleline were alerted for the all-out enemy crossing attack on the evening of Jul 15. Aerial strikes were initiated to prevent enemy armor on the north side of river, but enemy tanks began firing at 13:00 on Jul. 14. Recoilless rifles and machine gun fires of the A company inflicted heavy casualties on this crossing attempt at and near the bridge, but some of the North Koreans got across under cover of tanks fires. The first enemy tank was appeared on the south side of river just before dusk of Jul. 15, and eight more tanks were followed. Under the order of the regimental commander, the battalion began to withdraw at 13:30, though it was planned to do at dusk.   

The below photograph shows a scene of the riverbed of the Kum River to the north of Saejong City Hall, which was protected by the A Company.

After exploring the A Company front of the south bank of the river, I drove eastward on the street of Saejong abutted with the Bihak Mountain and turned to left northward at the Saesam Crossroad. Again, turned right eastward at the Sodam Crossroad for Kwaehwa Mountain which was called the Hill 200 by the American troops. I parked my car at a vacant housing field formed deep between mountain ridges to explore the defensive line of the C Company on the right regimental sector. The defensive line was set up low hills of the mountain adjacent to the river and the bend by the inflowing Samsung Creek, so the right part of the river was remained undefended. Across this field, at the far right of the regimental line at the confluence with the river and Kap Creek near a railroad bridge, the E Company was dispatched north to southward to protect the north of Taejon from infiltrating from Sintanjin along the river but the river from the confluence of the Miho River to Kumho-ri for 2 km was remained without force. On the evening of July 15, an alert for Chinese attack was rang by the battalion commander toward all units along the river, while supporting mortar and artillery fires on the enemy-held village across the river. The straw huts were burning with reddish glow by the air strikes too. In front of the hill, enemy crossing attempt was underway and repelled by the company fires. Two more attacks were followed in short intervals. At 0300 on July 16, North Koreans troops used boats and rafts, or waded and swam in every possible way tried to cross the river under support of their powerful artillery fires and flares dropped by an enemy plane. At this critical time, the flares support assigned to the 11^th Field Artillery Battery were not provided for a considerable time due to the artillery misunderstanding.  Meanwhile, North Koreans troops succeeded in crossing the river at 04:00 in front of the gap between the C Company and E Company on the regimental right and struck the eastern sector of C Company. The sector was overrun by the multiple attacks and North Korea troops exploited it by extensive infiltration to the 1^st Battalion rear and attacked supporting mortar positions and observation and command posts. The withdrawal of all regiment units was ordered at 1330 on Jul 16 but the C Company had trouble in getting the men to leave their foxholes under enemy mortar fires. The company was led along the base of the hill toward the highway and reached when the A & B Companies were disappearing south along it. At that time, enemy troops starting forward from the vicinity of the Kumnam Bridge saw the C Company approaching to them and ran back. They withdrew via Balsan-ni, the regimental command post, fighting off the enemy attack from the hill.   

The below photograph shows a scene of the Kaehwa Mountain in Saejong occupied by the C Company.

After exploring the Kaehwa Mountain of the Hill 200, I drove along the City Hall Street near to the river from the east to the west, observing the river frontline. I parked my car near the Starbucks Coffee and took a cup of coffee with my wife. This area was the Forest Wind River Park near the Kumnam Bridge which had been destroyed in the battle. I walked along the riverbed examining the defensive line of A Company, and it was good to tread the clay trail on the riverbed in a lunch time. I drove and dropped by a restaurant in the downtown for lunch. After lunch break, I drove back toward the Keumnam Office near Bali Peak where the 1^st battalion commander post was set up, looking for crossing a way of Yongsu Creek and passed cross the Saejong Street through a under-path. I crossed the creek through the Seongdeok Bridge and drove up to a high point of Seongkok-ni. Parking my car by the ruined senior town hall with my wife liking to stay at my car, It was warm and sunny at the daylight and just after a lunch, my wife might be sleepy and tired. I walked around the area to explore the B Company defensive line supposed to be set up around the low hills of mountain ridges of the Seongdeok Mountain stretched down at three directions from the peak: north, north-west and north-east ridges. This sector was surrounded by the Kum River to the north and west, by Yongsu Creek to the east, and the 300 m height of Junggeun Peak to the south of its rear. Just beyond the peak southward, there was Tuman-ni where the 52^nd Artillery Battery position was set up and later North Korean’s roadblock was established in the time of all-out withdrawal of the 19^th Regiment in the afternoon of July 16.  

The below photograph shows a scene of the valley toward the river from a hill of Seongdeok-ni, Saejong

In the time of battle, at around 0400, the largest river crossing was taken place by the North Korean force. The B Company saw an estimated 300 to 400 North Koreans soldiers already crossed the river on a high ground south of them. 25 to 30 North Koreans were wading into the river, holding their weapons on their heads and plunging into neck-deep water at a supposed ferry site of Wonbong-ni on the west of Seongdeok-ni. The men of the B Company could see from their observation post enemy camouflaged with shrubs and small trees remaining in the hills and moving south to the supposed Balsan-ni and Tuman-ni area. The artillery fire was called on to the enemy crossing point. A platoon of the company was isolated by the enemy dominating the A Company sector at 0800. When the withdrawal order was rung at 1330 in Jul 16, the B Company could be protected by the reserve force F Company on the opposite side of Balsan-ni around the Yougae Mountain. At the time of withdrawal of the 1^st Battalion, the F Company was under fire.

Two major infiltration routes are the mountain ridges in this Wonkok-ni Youngkok-ni and Kukgong-ni along the current Dangjin-Youngdeok Expressway and the unmanned sector between the Company C and E in around Buyong-ni. The front defensive line of the A Company was collapsed down, when the North Koreans started all-out attack along the line in the early morning of Jul 16, when the flares were not fired by the designated artillery in rear.

Retrospect

As a retrospect of the battle, I think if the regimental commander didn’t dispatch the G Company to the west sector and ordered to stay at the original reserve sector behind A Company, they could maintain the defensive line in Taepyong-ni( Saejong) in the morning of Jul 16, utilizing this reserve company to reinforce the A Company. The E Company in the far-right sector didn’t engage in any fighting, so it could be transported to reinforce the C Company, and the attack toward the infiltrating North Koreans behind the C Company could be possible to lessen enemy powers in the rear. If the F Company was relocated to the rear of the artillery batteries in around Tunsan-ni, from the A Company sector, in the morning of Jul 16 before all-out retreat, they could help to harass the enemy trying to set up a roadblock at the rear of the artillery batteries or protect the breakout of the regiments. But I think that each member of regiment was very exhausted for 3 night and 4 days battle in the hot summer without sleeping, they couldn’t well be equipped with communication equipment and trucks were not fully available due to damage from the previous battles. I think if they could set up their defensive positions not for attempting breakout, as the retreating troops were gathering at around the North Korean’s roadblock, they could be saved by the relief force leaded approaching up by General Dean from Youseong in the early morning of Jul 17.

After the Kum River Battle exploration around Kongju and Saejong taken place in July 1950, I made my way back home, firstly I drove on the national road 1 paved northward from Saejong and took the provicial road 604 running for Jeongan IC. While I was driving a little faster than the normal speed, many cars and heavy duty vehicles overtook speedily me. From the IC, I took an expressway and at the Cheonan Junction, I changed the road with the Kyungbu Expressway, dropping by a service area to take a cup of coffee and kept driving northward to the Anseong Junction. I drove eastward on the Pyongraek-Jaecheon Expressway and changed the road for the new expressway of the Kyungbu Expressway 2 at the South Anseong Junction. I was good on the road because there was few cars and was back home.    I would like to thank my wife who was willingly accompany with me though she wasn't interested in battle history and got understood the battle and its meaning.