The Battles and Tactics of U.S. 1st Marine Division Fighting Bravely at Threat of Initial Stage of Korean War 한군전 초기 절대절명의 위기에서 분투한 미 해병 1여단의 마산 전투 및 전술

다음 사항은 미 해병대가 한국과 어떠한 인연이 있는가를 생각하던 중 1950.8 초 한군전 초기 북한군에 의해 국가가 공산화될 풍전등화의 시기에 미 해병여단(미 제1해뎡사단을 투입하기 위한 선발 부대이 Walker 미 제8군 사령관의 “Stand or Die..”전략을 낙동강 전선에서 실행하는 모범적인 사례로 판단하여 8ㅑㅑㅑ

ㅑㅓ 한다.

The following is that while thinking about the relationship between the U.S. Marines and Korea, the U.S. Marine Brigade (the advance unit to deploy the U.S. 1st Marine Division) was dispatched to the perimeter of river of Nakdong during the early days of the Korean War in August 1950, when the country was about to become communist by the North Korean Aggressor. I would like to introduce the US Marines who accomplished the ‘Stand or Die.’ strategy of the commander of the U.S. 8th Army, judging it to be an exemplary case of implementation on the front.

미 해병 1여단(추후 1사단으로 통합됨)의 1950.8.1 한국전 투입은 낙동강 방어선을 사수하기로 결정한 후 북한군의 침투에 의한 방어선이 붕괴로 부산이 함락되고 긴급하게 참전한 미 육군이 한국을 철수할 수밖에 없는 긴급한 상황에서 이루어졌다.

The US 1st Marine Brigade (later integrated into the 1st Division) entered the Korean War on August 1, 1950, after deciding to defend the defense line of Nakdong River. The city of Pusan was faced with the risk of being fell due to the collapse of the defense line by North Korean Infiltration, and the forces of US Army, which had urgently entered the war, was forced to withdraw from Korea. It was done in an urgent situation that had no choice for the marines to do so.

미 육군 24사단과 기병 1사단 및 25사단이 투입되어 축차적으로 북한군의 진격을 지연시키면서 낙동강 방어선을 최후의 방어선으로 결정한 것은 Walker 미 8군 사령관이었다. 1950.7.5 오산 죽미령에서 24사단 1대대가 최초로 무너진 후 평택, 천안 및 금강에서 지연전을 펼쳤으나 압도적인 화력과 병력으로 무장한 북한군에게 효과적으로 지연전을 펼치지 못하고 1950.7.19-20 대전에서 (각 연대는 1개 대대 병력수준으로 약화됨) 총력을 다하여 지연전을 펼쳤으나 대부분 사단병력이 북한군의 후방 포위에 의해 와해되었다. 

긴급하게 포항으로부터 상륙하여 투입된 기병 1사단과 25사단이 24사단 잔존병력과 마지막 지연전을 펼치면서 낙동강 전선으로 후퇴한바 있었다.

The U.S. Army's 24th Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and 25th Division were deployed sequentially to delay the North Korean Forces Advance, and it was the Commander of U.S. 8th Army Walker who decided that the Nakdong River defense line would be the last line of defense. After the 1st Battalion of the 24th Division was first defeated at the pass of Jukmi in Osan on July 5, 1950, it fought a delayed battle in Pyeongtaek, Cheonan, and the river of Geum, but was unable to wage an effective delayed war against the North Korean army armed with overwhelming firepower and troops. The 24^th Division fought a delaying battle with all its capability in the city of Taejeon on July 19-20, 1950 ( at that time, each regiment was weakened to the level of battalion), but most of the division troops were disintegrated by the rear encirclement of North Korean Tactic. The 1st Cavalry and 25th Division which had urgently landed and deployed from Pohang, fought a final delayed battle with the remaining troops of the 24th Division and retreated to the perimeter of Nakdong River.

Walker 장군은 천혜의 낙동강 방어선을 활용하여 수적으로 적은 미군과 한국군 병력으로 결사 대항하고자 하였으나 대구 북축으로부터 영천, 안강 및 포항에 이르는 동측 방어선은 

낙동강의 지형적인 이점이 없었고 방어선 서측 최하단부는 낙동강이 부산측으로 인접하여 흐르기 때문에강 건너 진주에서 방어선을 유지해야 하는 어려움을 않고 있었다.

General Walker attempted to fight desperately with the numerically small U.S. and South Korean Forces by utilizing the natural defense line of Nakdong River, but the eastern defense line from the northern Daegu to Yeongcheon, Angang, and Pohang was difficult to defend. There was no topographical advantage of the Nakdong River, and the lowest point on the western side of the front line, because the Nakdong River flows adjacent to Pusan. He had the difficulty to fight off at Jinju across the river

국군 5개 사단을 낙동강 북부 전선으로 투입하고 왜관에서 남측으로 낙동강 서부전선은 4개 미군 사단을 투입하여 결사항전의 의지를 휘하의 부대에게 표명하였으나 

낙동강 돌출부 등 도강이 용이하고 방어선이 넓어 북한군에게 계속 뚫려서 대구의 8군 

사령부 및 아군 전체 전선의 보급로가 위협을 받게 되었다. 특히 북한군 최정예 6사단과 기갑사단이 대전을 함락하고 호남으로 남진한 후 진주를 거쳐 동쪽 마산으로 진격해 오고 있으나 방어를 맞고 있던 25사단이 계속 후퇴를 하게 되어 

절대절명의 위험성이 존재하는 상황에서 미해병이 투입되었다.

Five ROK Divisions were deployed to the northern front of Nakdong River, and four U.S. Divisions were deployed to the western front of Nakdong River from Waegwan to the south, expressing to the units under their command their will to fight to death. The bulge of Nakdong River was easy to cross and the defense line was so wide, so it is continuously penetrated by the North Korean, leading to the threat of 8th Army in Taegu in the regard of headquarters and supply routes of the entire front line. In particular, the North Korean's elite 6th Division and Armored Division captured Taejeon, advanced south to the province of Honam, and advanced to Masan in the east via Jinju, but theUS 25th Division, which was in charge of defense, continued to retreat. The U.S. Marines were deployed in a situation of threats.

Walker 장군은 Craig 해병 여단장에게 1950.8.1 부산 상륙 후 차량으로 창원으로 이동하여 대기하였다가 후속적으로 그의 명령을 받도록 하였다. 장거리 이동에 따른 피로를 다스릴 

겨를도 없이 부대는 1950.8.6 마산 남측 창원으로 이동하였다가 추가적인 명령으로 1950.8.7 진동리에서 적과 최초의 전투를 벌이게 된다.

General Walker instructed Marine Brigadier General Craig to move to Changwon by vehicles after landing in Pusan on August 1, 1950, stand by there, and subsequently receive his orders. Deal with fatigue caused by long distance movement, without time, the unit moved to Changwon, south of Masan on August 6, 1950, and then, upon additional orders, fought its first battle with the enemy at Jindong-ri on the western hilly area of Masan on August 7, 1950.

진동리는 25사단이 2개의 육군 전투연대와 합동으로 Kean 사단장이 지휘하고 있었으나 1950.8.15 부산점령을 목표로 강력하게 진격해오는 북한군에 고전을 하고 있었다. Kean 사단장은 Walker 장군으로부터 당초는 UN군 최초로 진주 쪽으로 공격작전을 시행하여 

북한군을 격파하고 낙동강 전선에 밀집한 북한군의 전력을 분산시켜 아군의 대 공세로 

전환하는 계기를 확보하도록 지시 받았었다.

In Jindong-ri, the US 25th Division was jointly commanded by Division Commander Kean with two army combat regiments, but was struggling against the North Korean Force, which was advancing strongly with the goal of occupying Pusan on August 15, 1950. Division Commander Kean was initially instructed by General Walker to carry out an offensive maneuver toward Jinju, the first UN Force to do so. He was instructed leading to a large-scale offensive to defeat the North Korean Force and disperse the power of the North Korean Force concentrated on the Nakdong River Front.

해병 1사단 5연대가 선발로 진동리에 진격하여 부산과 대구를 있는 주 보급로를 

차단하고자 하는 북한군에 맞서 중요한 342 고지를 방어하고 있는 육군 전투연대 소속의 1개 대대를 지원하여 고지를 사수하였고, 한여름 열기속에서 1950.8.9 계속하여 북한군의 매복 및 기습을 물리치고 255고지를 공격하여 점령하였다. 미 해병대는 이어서 진동리에서 남서쪽 방향으로 배둔리로 야간행군까지 감행하며 진격한후 북한군이 집결하고 있는 고성으로 

정찰대를 시켰다. 1950.8.10-11 진동리로부터 배둔리까지 진격하면서 북한군을 격퇴하고 

고성으로 남진을 하던 중 선발대가 북한군의 기습을 받았으나 후방으로부터 지원된 

탱크의 화력지원으로 적을 격퇴하였고 다시 공격해온 적을 백병전까지 치르면서 격퇴하며 고성에 진입하였다. 미 해병대는 고성에서 서쪽으로 사천을 목표로 다시 진격하였다. 이때 북한군 기갑연대가 고성으로 진격했다가 사천방향으로 급하게 이동하기 위해 차량을 이동시키는데 미 해병 전투기에 의해 완전하게 섬멸되었고 길에는 120대 정도의 오토바이, 

트럭 및 Jeep차 잔해가 널브러져 있었다.

The 5th Regiment of the 1st Marine Division advanced to Jindong-ri in the lead and defended the hill by supporting one battalion of the Army Combat Regiment defending the important Hill 342 against the North Korean Force which was trying to cut off the main supply route to Pusan and Taegu. On August 9, 1950, they continued to defeat the North Korean's ambush and attack, and occupied Hill 255. The U.S. Marine Regiment then marched with a night march from Jindong-ri to the southwest toward Baedun-ri, then advanced to Goseong, where North Korean Troops were concentrated. A scouting party was ordered to move during 1950.8.10-11. They defeated the North Koreans while advancing from Jindong-ri to Baedun-ri. While advancing south toward Goseong, the advance party was ambushed by North Korean Troops, but the enemy was repelled with fire support from tanks, and the enemy that attacked again was defeated again in close combat. The marines entered the village of Kosong and advanced again west, aiming for Sacheon. At this time, the North Korean Armored Regiment was moving vehicles toward Sacheon from Kosong, but was detected and completely destroyed by U.S. Marine Fighter Planes, leaving about remains of 120 motorcycles, trucks and jeeps strewn about on the road.

이 전투는 한국전에 투입된 미 해병뿐만 아니라 전체 미 제8군에서 한국전 발발 이후 

북한군에 대한 최초의 승리였다. 특히 해병 여단장이 전술적으로 활용하는 Helicopter 순찰, 전투에서 근접 항공지원과 기갑정찰을 활용하여 북한군에 없는 차별화된 미 해병만의 전투력으로 승리를 이끌었다.

It was the first victory over the North Korean Forces not only by the U.S. Marines deployed in the Korean War, but also by the entire U.S. 8th Army after the outbreak of the Korean War. In particular, the Marine Brigade Commander's Tactical Use of Helicopter patrols, close air support, and armored reconnaissance in battle led to victory with the unique combat power of the U.S. Marines, which the North Korean Forces did not have.

특히 근접 전투지원을 위해 주간에 항상 선회하고 있으면서 정확하게 적을 폭격하는 미해병 전투기는 병력에서 압도되고 한 여름의 열기에 의해 녹초가 되어 전선이 붕괴될 수 있는 극적인 순간에 미 해병에 불리한 전황을 역전시키기도 하였다. 

최초로 사용된 Helicopter는 여단장이 전장에서 대대장과 전황을 신속하게 보고받고 즉각 작전을 지시하는데 활용되었고 고지의 병력에게 탄약과 식수를 공급하거나 

부상당한 병사를 후송하는데 활용되었다. 또한 부대 간의 무전과 유선망을 항상 유지하여 

여단의 통합적인 전투력을 발휘하고 야포와 항공화력 지원을 극대화하여 병력에서 압도하는 

북한군에 대적하였다. 해병 사령관이 전략적으로 중요하여 고지를 선정하면 휘하의 

각 부대장은 고지를 점령하기 위한 병력선정과 화력지원 방안을 계획하고 작전시기 및 

위치를 결정한 후 전황을 모니터링하여 공격과 후퇴 전술을 실행하며 동시에 지원체계를 

가동시켜 병력을 유지하였다. 

In particular, U.S. Marine Fighter Jets, which are always circling during the day to provide close combat support and accurately bomb the enemy, can turn the tide of battle that is unfavorable for the U.S. Marines at a dramatic moment when the front line could collapse due to being overwhelmed by North Korean Troops and exhausted by the midsummer heat. Helicopter, which was first used in Korean War, was used for each battalion commander to quickly report the situation of the battle to the brigade commander and give back immediately an operational instruction. It was also used to supply ammunition and drinking water to troops on high ground and to evacuate injured soldiers. In addition, the brigade's radio and wired networks are always maintained between each unit.

By demonstrating integrated combat power and maximizing field artillery and air firepower support, they confronted the overwhelmingly superior North Korean Force. When the commander of the U.S. Marine Brigade selected a hill of strategic importance, each unit under his command, after planning the selection of troops and fire support plan to occupy the hill, deciding the timing and location of the operation, monitoring the war situation, executing attack and retreat tactics, and maintaining the troops by activating the support system at the same time.

산에 오르거나 고지에서 적의 공격을 격퇴하고 부상당한 동료를 후송하기 위해 하산하고 다시 탄약과 식수를 운반하기 위해 산에 오르는 전투과정에서 북한군의 저격과 매복에 의한 살상 위험성을 감수하면서 각각의 미 해병대원은 부여된 임무를 끝까지 수행하였다. 즉 위험성에 대한 공포를 극복하면 적과 전투를 계속하여 살상할 수 있고 전선을 교란하여 승기를 

잡을 수 있다는 신념이 있었다.

Each U.S. Marine braved the risk of being killed by North Korean sniping and ambushes while climbing a mountain to repel an enemy attack from a high mountain ridge, descending a mountain to evacuate a wounded comrade, and climbing again to transport ammunition and drinking water. They carried out their assigned mission to the end. In other words, if you overcome the fear of danger, you can continue to fight and kill the enemy, and disrupt the enemy front to achieve victory. Marines had this belief that they could catch victory.

해병 여단장이 진동리 고지전투에서 한여름 무더위속에 지쳐버린 병력임에도 쉼없이 야간에 배둔리까지 진격을 하도록 명령하였다. 이것은 미군은 통상적으로 야간에는 움직이지 않는다는 점을 이용하려는 북한군의 의도를 교란시키고자 한 것이며 해병 여단장이 자기 부대원의 능력을 알지 못하였다면 명령을 내리지 못하였을 것이다. 또 부대원들도 여단장과 연대장 및 그들의 대대장의 명령을 신뢰하지 못하였다면 극한의 

상황에서 그들의 숨어있는 능력을 발휘하지도 못했을 것이다.  전투에서 압도적인 

적이 버티고 있는 상황에서 사령관의 단 한 번의 작전 실수는 병력과 장비의 손실을

초래하여 전력을 치명적으로 상실하고 전투에서 패하게 된다. 미 해병여단은 훈련을 받은 데로 부대 간의 공조를 강화하여 적재적소에 예비대 투입은 물론 전방 부대 간의 병력과 

화력을 이동시켜 전력을 응집시켜 어떠한 전투상황에서 적을 압도하였다.

The Marine Brigade Commander ordered the troops to advance to Baedun-ri at night without stopping, even though the troops were exhausted in the midsummer heat during the battle of Jindong-ri hills. This was intended to confuse the North Korean’s intention to take advantage of the fact that U.S. Troops always do not move at night, and the Marine Brigade Commander would not have been able to give the order if he did not know the capabilities of his unit members. Also, if the unit members did not trust the orders of the Brigade Commander, Regiment Commander, and their Battalion Commander, when they faced extreme hardships. They could not have been able to use their hidden abilities under the circumstances being overwhelmed in battle. In a situation where the enemy is holding out, a single operational mistake by the commander can result in the significant loss of troops and equipment. This results in a fatal loss of power and defeat in battle. The U.S. Marine Brigade strengthened cooperation between units, as it received training, not only deploying reserve units in the right places, but also strengthening the coordination between front-line units, moving firepower, and concentrating fighting power that the enemy was overwhelmed in any combat situation.

여단장은 북한군의 매복과 포위 전술은 대단히 우수하기에 그의 부대를 이동시킬 때 항상 경비행기로 사전 공격경로에 대하여 항공정찰을 시행하여 작전을 수립하고 선발대를 투입할 때 화력과 방호기능을 갖춘 기갑차량을 배치하여 전장에서 

벌어질 수 있는 위험성을 관리하였다.

The U.S. Brigade Commander was well aware of the ambush and encirclement tactics of the North Korean Force, so when moving his troops, he always conducted aerial reconnaissance in advance for the operational route with a light aircraft to establish an action plan and deployed armored vehicle with firepower and protection functions when deploying an infantry unit. In this way, possible battlefield risks could be controlled for his mission.

미 해병대는 공격작전을 할 때는 항상 지치지 않은 부대를 전방으로 투입하는 원칙이 있었고 위기의 순간에 솔선하여 앞장서는 장교와 하사관의 Leadership이 존재하였다. 작전지역에서 미 육군은 수송차량으로 이동을 하는 경우에도 미 해병은 도보로 사주경계를 하며 행군하였고 임무가 수행되면 명령을 기다리지 않고 즉각적인 적의 기습에 대비하는 후속 조치를 먼저 시행하고 다음 작전에 대비하여 적에게 결코 허점을 노출시키지 않았다.

The U.S. Marine always had the principle of deploying untired units to a front during offensive operations, and there was leadership in officers and non-commissioned officers who took the lead in moments of crisis. Even when the U.S. Army moved in transport vehicles in the operational area, the U.S. Marines marched on foot and on guard. Once the mission was accomplished, they first took follow-up measures to prepare for an immediate enemy surprise attack without waiting for orders and prepared for the next operation. Never exposed any loopholes to the enemy.

아마도 미 해병대원은 적과 싸우기 위한 목적으로 자원 입대를 하고 실전과 같은 전술훈련을 통하여 전투능력을 갖추었기에 실전에서 다양한 위험성을 극복할 수 있는 각개 병사로 탄생하여 부대의 명령을 완수하여 강력한 전투력을 발휘한다 생각한다. 이러한 해병대와 같이 합동작전에 참가하여 전투를 수행한 미 육군 제25사단 27전투연대장 Michaelis는 스스로 다음과 같이 육군에 대하여 비판하였다. “우리 육군은 전투에 대하여 너무나 중요하지 않은 이론과 지식을 전달하는데 집중하고 있어 정말 필요한 사격술, 정찰, 포위 기동 및 방어진지 구축과 같은 사항을 훈련시키지 못하고 있다. 육군 훈련병은 공산주의와 민주주의에 대하여 배우고 있으나 정작 총알이 날라 다니는 전장에서 전투병으로서 필수적인 포복과 각개전투를 효과적으로 수행하는 것에 대하여는 배우지 못하고 있다.”

Perhaps, U.S. Marines enlist voluntarily for the purpose of fighting the enemy and are equipped with combat capabilities through tactical training in an actual combat situation, so they are born as individual soldiers who can overcome various risks in actual combat and achieve strong combat power by completing the unit's command. I think it works in the marines. Michaelis, commander of the US 27th Combat Regiment of 25th Division, who participated in joint operations with the marines, criticized the army as follows: “Our army is so focused on delivering unimportant theories and knowledge about combat that it is unable to train truly necessary things such as marksmanship, reconnaissance, encirclement maneuvers, and building defensive positions. Army trainees are learning about communism and democracy, but they are not learning how to effectively perform crawling and individual combat skill, which are essential as combat soldiers in a battlefield where bullets are flying.”